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COMMENT 
WHAT HAPPENS IF AUTOPSY REPORTS 
ARE FOUND TESTIMONIAL?: 
THE NEXT STEPS TO ENSURE THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF THESE CRITICAL 
DOCUMENTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 
Dana Amato* 
 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to 
confront the witnesses against her. This right to confrontation, known as the 
Confrontation Clause, applies to hearsay testimony. Therefore, even if a 
hearsay statement is admissible pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
the Sixth Amendment may prohibit its admission. Whether hearsay runs 
afoul of the Confrontation Clause depends on whether that hearsay is 
“testimonial” in nature. However, the Supreme Court has refused to define 
“testimonial.” Furthermore, what little guidance the Court has released 
about the correct interpretation of “testimonial” is fractured, conflicting, 
and confusing. This is especially troubling with respect to forensic hearsay 
documents because of their importance in criminal trials as well as their 
ubiquity and variety. Chief among these problematic documents is the 
autopsy report—an integral and controversial incarnation of forensic 
hearsay. Due to splits at the state and federal levels regarding the correct 
interpretation of this rule with respect to autopsy reports, as well as the 
high-stakes nature of its answer, this Comment argues that it is likely the 
Court will eventually consider the issue. Furthermore, it predicts that the 
outcome will be pose problems for prosecutors of murder cases. Therefore, 
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this Comment proposes a solution that might ensure the admissibility of 
these critical documents in criminal cases even if the Court’s ultimate 
ruling is problematic. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides that a criminal 
defendant has the right to be “confronted with the witnesses against him.”1 
This provision is commonly referred to as the “Confrontation Clause.” The 
U.S. Supreme Court radically changed its view of the Confrontation Clause 
in 2004 with Crawford v. Washington,2 a case which imposed a new 
fulcrum for Confrontation Clause cases: testimonial status.3 Under the old 
precedent, hearsay statements were admissible when the declarant was 
unavailable for trial but the statements contained sufficient “indicia of 
reliability” or “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”4 However, 
Crawford changed the inquiry: if a hearsay statement is offered against the 
 
1  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
2  541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
3  Id. at 53 (“In sum, even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with 
testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object . . . .”). 
4  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004). 
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defendant in a criminal trial and its declarant does not testify, the statement 
is inadmissible for its truth if the statement is “testimonial” in nature, 
without any question about the statement’s independent reliability.5 
Although the word “testimonial” is found nowhere in the text of the 
Confrontation Clause, the word testimonial became the central point upon 
which all post-Crawford cases turned.6 The Supreme Court has openly 
refused to define the word and has not produced coherent guidance to the 
lower courts on how to implement this precedent.7 
One of the more severe consequences of Crawford and its progeny is 
the lack of clarity surrounding a certain type of hearsay integral to many 
murder trials across the country: autopsy reports. Although the Court has 
heard some cases regarding the admissibility of other types of forensic 
hearsay in the event of declarant unavailability, it has flatly refused to take 
up a case concerning the testimonial status of autopsy reports, despite a 
recent opportunity to do so.8 
This Comment will make three main arguments about this issue. First, 
confusion in lower courts, the significant circuit and state splits on the 
issue, and the sheer importance of autopsy reports to the criminal justice 
system all make it more likely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari 
on this issue. Moreover, whether autopsy reports are admissible in 
“declarant-unavailable” situations9 is a clear question that warrants a clear 
 
5  Id. at 53–54 (majority opinion). 
6  See infra Part II. 
7  See infra Part II. 
8  See infra Part II for a discussion on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Medina v. Arizona, 
134 S. Ct. 1309, 1309 (2014) (raising the sole issue on appeal as to “[w]hether an autopsy 
report created as part of a homicide investigation, and asserting that the death was indeed 
caused by homicide, is ‘testimonial’ under the Confrontation Clause framework established 
in [Crawford]”). 
9  The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence when the 
declarant is unavailable: 
(a) A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant: 
(1) is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant’s statement because 
the court rules that a privilege applies; 
(2) refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so; (3) testifies to not 
remembering the subject matter; 
(4) cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a then-existing 
infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness; or 
(5) is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement’s proponent has not been able, by 
process or other reasonable means, to procure: 
(A) the declarant’s attendance, in the case of a hearsay exception under Rule 804(b)(1) or 
(6); or 
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answer. Second, it is likely, based on existing precedent and the opinions 
authored by multiple justices on this topic, that the Court could find autopsy 
reports testimonial for the purpose of the Confrontation Clause. Lastly, this 
Comment explains the problem that results from this finding—namely, 
barring the admission of an autopsy report where its creator is unavailable 
for trial—and proposes an interdisciplinary solution to that problem. This 
Comment proposes that the medical community should enact a national 
standard for conducting autopsy reports. This standard should mandate 
preservation of the autopsy procedure with the explicit intent that future 
experts will be able to look at the report to draw independent conclusions 
without having to rely on the testimonial opinions of the original medical 
examiner. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In order to fully appreciate the complexity of this evidentiary issue, 
some background on the evolution of the law is necessary. The Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on what counts as “testimonial” under the 
Confrontation Clause is at best unclear and at worst irreconcilable.10 The 
Court has a tendency to push off the difficult task of providing a concrete 
definition for “testimonial” evidence in favor of embracing a fact-specific 
analysis of the evidence in each case.11 As a result, the current law has been 
interpreted in varying (often contradictory) ways by federal circuit and state 
courts alike.12 
A.  WHAT THE SUPREME COURT SAID 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Crawford, abrogated previous 
Confrontation Clause precedent from the 1980s.13 Crawford is now 
considered the landmark decision of current Confrontation Clause 
 
(B) the declarant’s attendance or testimony, in the case of a hearsay exception under Rule 
804(b)(2), (3), or (4). 
FED. R. EVID. 804. 
10  See, e.g., Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 331 (2009) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (“Now, without guidance from any established body of law, the States can only 
guess what future rules this Court will distill from the sparse constitutional text.”). 
11  See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
12  See infra, pp. 18–26 (discussing the splits among the circuit and state courts). 
13  541 U.S. at 67. See generally Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) abrogated by 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (codifying a two-part test for the admissibility 
of testimonial evidence in declarant-unavailable situations: (1) the state must make a good-
faith effort to locate the unavailable witness and (2) the state must prove that the evidence 
carries sufficient indicia of trustworthiness). 
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jurisprudence.14 The defendant in Crawford was tried for assault and 
attempted murder.15 The state offered into evidence an incriminating, 
previously recorded statement made to the police by the defendant’s wife, 
who did not testify at his trial.16 The defendant argued that admission of this 
evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to be “confronted with 
witnesses against him.”17 The Washington trial court had originally 
admitted the statement under the Ohio v. Roberts18 standard, namely 
because the statement had sufficient indicia of reliability.19  Still, under the 
Roberts standard, the appellate court of Washington reversed the trial 
court’s decision on the ground that parts of the statement were sufficiently 
reliable, but others were not.20 Finally, the Supreme Court of Washington 
reversed the appellate court decision, finding the statements sufficiently 
reliable and therefore admissible because the statement “sufficiently 
interlocked” with the defendant’s own statements, thereby meeting the 
Roberts standard.21  
The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the defendant’s 
arguments.22 In doing so, the Supreme Court established a new rule: any 
evidence that is “testimonial”—even if such evidence does not come from a 
live witness—triggers the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation 
Clause.23  In declaring this new rule, Justice Scalia reasoned, “the 
[Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, 
but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not 
that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”24 The Court 
refused to further explain its new understanding of the Confrontation 
Clause. Sidestepping the issue of exactly what “testimonial evidence” looks 
like, the Court declared “[w]e leave for another day any effort to spell out a 
 
14  Daniel J. Capra & Joseph Tartakovsky, Autopsy Reports and the Confrontation 
Clause: A Presumption of Admissibility, 2 VA. J. CRIM. L. 62, 66 (2014). 
15  541 U.S. at 40. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18  448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
19  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36. 
20  State v. Crawford, 107 Wash. App. 1025, 1025 (2001), rev’d, 147 Wash. 2d 424 
(2002), rev’d and remanded, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
21  State v. Crawford, 147 Wash. 2d 424, 427 (2002), rev’d and remanded, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004). 
22  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69. 
23  Id. at 40. 
24  Id. at 61. 
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comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”25 It did provide a list of 
examples, however, including but not limited to “prior testimony at a 
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and . . . police 
interrogations.”26 The Supreme Court’s justification for classifying the 
aforementioned evidence as categorically testimonial lies with the 
documents’ “clos[e] kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation 
Clause was [originally] directed.”27 
Chief Justice Rehnquist presciently asserted that by unnecessarily 
overturning Roberts, the decision in Crawford “casts a mantle of 
uncertainty over future criminal trials in both federal and state 
courts . . . .”28 This concurrence shows that the trouble Crawford would 
cause was recognized at the inception of the doctrine.29 
The next key case regarding the testimonial nature of certain hearsay 
evidence was Davis v. Washington,30 a 9–0 decision in favor of the 
respondent, the State of Indiana.31 In that case, the Supreme Court clarified 
that: 
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable 
statements—or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation—
as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases to hold 
as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They 
are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.32 
In other words, if the primary purpose of the hearsay statement was to aid 
police during an emergency—for example, “The man who shot her turned 
left down the street!”—the hearsay statement is nontestimonial. This is 
because the statement, when said, was not intended to accuse anyone of 
 
25  Id. at 68. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
29  Note that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence was mainly concerned with (what he 
considered to be) the arbitrary and spontaneous distinction that appeared between testimonial 
and non-testimonial statements in the majority opinion. Id. at 71. His immediate reservation 
regarding the lack of clarity Crawford provides to lower courts, coupled with the confusion 
that actually ensued, supports this Comment’s argument that the Court should hear another 
Confrontation Clause case. 
30  547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
31  Id. at 834. 
32  Id. at 822 (emphasis added). 
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wrongdoing (as the purpose of the statement would be in a courtroom), but 
rather it was said to assist police during an emergency. A statement made at 
the time of an emergency to the police is exempt from some of the general 
dangers of hearsay statements, such as the fear that the declarant is lying or 
misremembering what occurred; therefore, the ability to cross-examination 
the declarant is far less important.33 On the other hand, the same statement 
“The man who shot her turned left down the street,” could be testimonial if 
the emergency were no longer occurring; for example, if it were said to the 
police in an interview the following day. Without the contemporaneousness 
and urgency of the ongoing emergency, the statement in this context is no 
different than any other hearsay statement, and thus poses the same dangers 
(e.g., honesty or reliability).34 A statement made without the pressure of 
emergency is testimonial because it is intended to provide some kind of 
evidence (or testimony) against an individual; therefore, the right of the 
defendant to cross-examine the declarant should be strictly protected. 
The first Supreme Court case dealing with the testimonial status of 
forensic documents came three years after Davis, in Melendez–Diaz v. 
Massachusetts,35 where the Court ruled that forensic reports could be 
testimonial.36 The reports in question in that case were “certificates” 
provided by state laboratory analysts, which stated that the substance seized 
by the police in connection with the defendant’s trial was cocaine.37 Justice 
Scalia again wrote for the Court, describing the certificates as 
“declaration [s] [sic] of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant 
before an officer authorized to administer oaths,” making them “quite 
plainly affidavits,” which are categorically testimonial pursuant to 
Crawford.38 It is important to note that the certificates were determined to 
be testimonial even though the documents themselves did not accuse the 
defendant of wrongdoing.39 Justice Scalia noted that it was sufficient for the 
documents to “provid[e] testimony against petitioner, proving one fact 
necessary for his conviction—that the substance he possessed was 
cocaine.”40 In other words, the documents were substituted for the 
testimony that the analysts would have given if called as witnesses at trial. 
 
33  Ronald J. Allen, et al., The Hearsay Rule, in EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 
414–20 (2002). 
34  Id. 
35  557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
36  Id. at 310–11. 
37  Id. at 307. 
38  Id. at 310 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (8th ed. 2004)). 
39  Id. at 313. 
40  Id. 
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Thus, Crawford’s prohibition against testimonial hearsay barred their 
admission regardless of whether the defendant was personally mentioned in 
the documents themselves.41 This same argument would later apply to the 
debate about the testimonial nature of autopsy reports. 
Melendez–Diaz was a 5–4 opinion, in which many of the justices 
submitted their own individual concurrences, distancing themselves from 
certain specific points made by the majority. Justice Thomas concurred 
alone, defending his pre-Crawford stance that the Confrontation Clause is 
only implicated in “formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,” 
and limiting his agreement with the majority to the finding that the 
certificates were affidavits and therefore testimonial.42 Justice Kennedy 
vehemently dissented, joined by Justices Breyer, Alito, and Chief Justice 
Roberts.43 The dissent was incredulous toward the majority’s choice to 
“confidently disregard[] a century of jurisprudence” and to “swee[p] away 
an accepted rule governing the admission of scientific evidence.”44 
Moreover, the dissent accuses the majority of now forcing upon the States 
“an even more onerous burden than they did before Crawford. . . .  Now, 
without guidance from any established body of law, the States can only 
guess what future rules this Court will distill from the sparse constitutional 
text.”45 Recall that the sparse text of the U.S. Constitution does not contain 
the word “testimonial,” let alone a definition for it.46 The Melendez–Diaz 
dissent too warned of the dangers of such a precedent, specifically the 
inability of lower courts to predict future applications of the holding due to 
“the breadth of the Court’s ruling . . . and its undefined scope.”47 In 
particular, Justice Kennedy identifies the danger it could pose to “the range 
of other scientific tests that may be affected,” including autopsies.48 He 
reasons that in the event of a medical examiner’s unavailability at trial, the 
categorical exclusion of surrogate testimony for such tests could potentially 
create a statute of limitations for murder.49 This particular reservation of 
 
41  Id. at 313. 
42  Id. at 329 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 
(1992)). 
43  Id. at 330 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
44  Id. 
45  Id. at 331. 
46  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
47  Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. at 337 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
48  Id. at 335. 
49  Id. The fear is that this situation would exist in any murder case tried after the original 
autopsy performer has died. Once the original author of the document becomes unavailable, 
the autopsy becomes inadmissible. Therefore, cases that rely on the admission of autopsy 
reports to succeed have an expiration date—namely the life of the author. This would 
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Justice Kennedy’s would become a refrain for those advocating against a 
testimonial label for autopsy reports.50 
Just two years later, the Court ruled in Bullcoming v. New Mexico51 
that the analyst who performs the test and creates the forensic report must 
testify.52 In Bullcoming, the document in question was a blood-alcohol 
report in a drunk driving trial.53 Justice Ginsberg wrote for the Court this 
time, establishing that “[i]n all material respects, the [blood-alcohol] 
report . . . resembles those in Melendez–Diaz.”54 Even though the 
prosecution had produced a witness who knew the general laboratory 
procedures but did not perform or observe the test in question himself,55 the 
report was deemed inadmissible testimonial hearsay.56  Justices Kagan and 
Sotomayor joined the opinion in part, with Justice Sotomayor filing a short 
separate opinion;57 Justice Thomas joined in all but the parts from which 
Justices Kagan and Sotomayor distanced themselves, with an additional 
removal;58 and Justice Kennedy authored a dissent, in which Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Breyer and Alito joined.59 
The Court’s Bullcoming opinion was a 5–4 split, but it is clear that the 
individual justices were even more conflicted on the appropriate analysis of 
this issue than such a split might suggest. Justices Kagan60 and Sotomayor61  
joined the opinion in all but the part that discusses the burdens imposed in 
requiring the “analyst” of a report to testify at trial. Justice Sotomayor went 
 
function as a de facto statute of limitations on murder. 
50  See, e.g., Reid R. Allison, Confronting the Dead: The Supreme Court’s Confrontation 
Clause Jurisprudence and its Implications for Autopsy Reports, 1 CRIM. L. PRAC. 23, 32 
(2013) (noting that Justice Kennedy’s remark “had led commentators to caution that barring 
introduction of autopsy reports could in effect create a statute of limitations for murder, a 
patently unacceptable result as indicated by the fact that states normally do not have a statute 
of limitations for murder”). 
51  564 U.S. 647 (2011). 
52  Id. at 657–58. 
53  Id. at 655. 
54  Id. at 664. 
55  Witnesses who take “the place of another as a successor or substitute,” such as a 
witness with no personal knowledge of the analysis in question but who is familiar with the 
way analyses of that type are conducted, or a witness who is familiar with the results of the 
analysis in a specific case, are commonly referred to as “surrogates” or “surrogate 
witnesses.” BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 871 (3d ed. 2011). 
56  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 647–50 (2011). 
57  Id. at 651 n.†, 668. 
58  Id. at 651 n.†. 
59  Id. at 674. 
60  Id. at 651 n.†. 
61  Id. at 668. 
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even further by authoring her own concurrence which insisted that the 
proper analysis turned on the test articulated Davis,62 and “emphasiz[ing] 
the limited reach of the Court’s opinion.”63 Justice Thomas followed suit, 
but took the additional step of distancing himself from statements made in a 
particular footnote in the majority opinion as well.64 Justice Kennedy’s 
dissent (which is, ironically, the only portion of the opinion where more 
than two justices fully agree on the reasoning put forth), emphasizes the 
“serious misstep” of the Court to extend its Melendez–Diaz holding to a 
circumstance in which a knowledgeable laboratory employee was present to 
testify, but could not do so admissibly because he was not the analyst who 
transcribed the computerized blood-alcohol test onto the document itself.65 
In 2012, the Court heard Williams v. Illinois,66 in which the state had 
offered a DNA profile against the defendant by means of a forensic 
specialist from the Illinois State Police Laboratory.67 The forensic specialist 
testified that she matched a DNA profile produced by an outside laboratory 
to the profile produced by the state lab from a sample of the defendant’s 
blood.68 The Court found that the specialist’s testimony regarding the 
outside laboratory’s results was admissible, even though she was 
technically testifying to the testimonial statements of others.69 Justice Alito, 
writing for the plurality, reaffirmed that the Court’s recent jurisprudence, 
“while departing from prior Confrontation Clause precedent in other 
respects,” does not extend to testimony regarding the data underlying an 
expert’s conclusion (which would not be hearsay at all because the 
 
62  Id.; see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 814 (2006) (holding that statements 
are testimonial when their “primary purpose” is to establish or prove past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution). Justice Sotomayor insisted that the proper test to 
apply was whether the blood alcohol reports were made to stop an ongoing emergency or to 
preserve evidence, perhaps for use at a future trial. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 668 (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring). 
63  Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 668 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
64  Id. at 659 n.6. 
To rank as “testimonial,” a statement must have a “primary purpose” of “establish[ing] or 
prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Elaborating on the 
purpose for which a “testimonial report” is created, we observed in Melendez–Diaz that business 
and public records ‘are generally admissible absent confrontation . . . because—having been 
created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or 
proving some fact at trial—they are not testimonial. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
65  Id. at 674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
66  132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
67  Id. at 2227. 
68  Id. at 2229–31. 
69  Id. at 2243–44. 
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statements would not be admitted for their truth).70 Furthermore, Justice 
Alito reaffirmed that the outside lab report did not identify a “targeted 
individual” since the lab was not aware of the defendant’s identity; 
therefore, the report was not testimonial because the “primary purpose” of 
the statements contained therein was not to accuse the defendant of 
engaging in criminal conduct.71 
Although the case produced another 5–4 split, Justice Alito’s opinion 
in Williams speaks for only a plurality of the justices, including Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy. Justice Breyer filed a separate 
concurrence,72 Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment,73 and the 
remaining justices cleanly dissented.74 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence focuses mainly on a problem he believed 
was not addressed by the plurality nor the dissent: “How does the 
Confrontation Clause apply to the . . . underlying technical statements 
written by (or otherwise made by) laboratory technicians” in crime lab 
reports?75 He stated plainly that the “question [is] difficult, important, and 
not squarely addressed either today or in our earlier opinions” but it is 
answerable with further argument and briefing.76 Because there was no re-
argument, Justice Breyer combined the reasoning in the dissenting opinions 
in Melendez–Diaz and Bullcoming, together with the reasoning of the 
plurality in Williams.77 Justice Breyer eventually questioned what this 
precedent would mean for a case in which the autopsy performer dies 
before a murder trial, reviving Justice Kennedy’s question from the 
Melendez–Diaz dissent: “Is the Confrontation Clause ‘effectively’ to 
function ‘as a statute of limitations for murder?’”78 Under this precedent, 
Justice Breyer worried it very well might.79 
 
70  Id. at 2235. 
71  Id. at 2243–44. 
72  132 S. Ct. at 2244–55 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
73  Id. at 2255–64 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas concurred only in the 
judgment, using his previously-defended (but never embraced by any other justice) analysis 
concentrating on the lack of “formality and solemnity” in the outside laboratory’s 
statements. Agreeing with the dissent’s view of the flaws in the plurality’s analysis, Justice 
Thomas asserted that the statements were in fact hearsay used for their truth, but their lack of 
strict formality (such as would be present with affidavits) meant they were not testimonial. 
Id. at 2255–60. 
74  Id. at 2264–77 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
75  Id. at 2244 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
76  Id. at 2245. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. at 2251 (internal citations omitted). 
79  Id. (“Such a precedent could bar the admission of other reliable case-specific 
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Justice Kagan authored the dissent, joined by Justices Scalia, 
Ginsberg, and Sotomayor.80 She focused on the desperate need for cross-
examination of those who perform laboratory tests as a check on human 
error.81 This dissent viewed Williams as “open-and-shut” pursuant to “our 
Confrontation Clause precedents” because the prosecution introduced the 
results of a laboratory test through a witness with no personal knowledge of 
how it was generated.82 Significantly, Justice Kagan referred to Justice 
Alito’s opinion as “‘the plurality’ because that is the conventional term for 
it. But in all except its disposition, his opinion is a dissent: Five Justices 
specifically reject every aspect of its reasoning and every paragraph of its 
explication.”83 
It seems from the discussion above that the justices each had their own 
personal opinions on the way the issue should be decided, and those 
opinions did not often overlap. Furthermore, two justices predicted the 
confusion lower courts would experience when trying to apply what little 
guidance was provided to them by the Court.84 It is no surprise, then, that 
states and federal circuits alike have had difficulty addressing the issue of 
forensic reports in their own courtrooms. 
B.  WHAT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS HEARD 
The federal circuit courts have interpreted Crawford and its progeny in 
various ways. The following is by no means an exhaustive list of problems 
within the circuits regarding testimonial hearsay; the next few cases are 
examples of the different ways circuits have applied the Supreme Court’s 
unclear and fractured precedent. 
In 2008, the First Circuit held in United States v. De La Cruz85 that 
autopsy reports are “in the nature of a business record, and business records 
are expressly excluded from the reach of Crawford.”86 The court in De La 
 
technical information such as, say, autopsy reports. . . . What is to happen if the medical 
examiner dies before trial?”). 
80  Id. at 2264 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
81  Id. (providing an example of a California case in which a lab technician testified that 
the DNA sample she analyzed matched the defendant, only to re-take the stand later and 
admit that she had accidentally switched the samples; the sample labeled with the 
defendant’s name had actually come from the victim, and vice versa. This error was only 
uncovered after confrontation on cross-examination.). 
82  Id. at 2265. 
83  Id. 
84  Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. 305, 335 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Williams, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2245 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
85  514 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2008). 
86  Id. at 133. 
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Cruz rejected defendant’s argument on the merits because  
[a]n autopsy report is made in the ordinary course of business by a medical examiner 
who is required by law to memorialize what he or she saw and did during an autopsy. 
An autopsy report thus involves, in principal part, a careful and contemporaneous 
reporting of a series of steps taken and facts found by a medical examiner during an 
autopsy.87  
With that simple recognition of a well-known hearsay exception, the court 
disposed of the issue. 
However, when the First Circuit revisited the issue four years later in 
Nardi v. Pepe,88 instead of citing to its own precedent and dismissing the 
case, the court emphasized its confusion over the state of the law.89 Nardi 
concerned a murder trial in which the state offered into evidence the 
victim’s autopsy report.90 The only problem was that the original medical 
examiner had retired to Florida and was unavailable to travel to the trial in 
Massachusetts due to a medical condition.91 The state entered this evidence 
through a classic surrogate—a highly experienced medical examiner with 
no personal knowledge of the autopsy itself, but who had familiarized 
himself with the autopsy report, as well as photographs of the body, and 
drew his own independent conclusion from the materials.92 He arrived at the 
same conclusion as the original medical examiner.93 However, he also 
testified to the original medical examiner’s conclusion contained within the 
autopsy report, as well as the veracity of several facts also contained therein 
(of which he had no personal knowledge),94 which muddles the issue. The 
First Circuit found this testimony perfectly admissible—but did so based 
upon the “present uncertainty of the law,” the fact that it was “even more 
unsettled at the time of Crawford,” just how far Crawford’s ruling would 
extend, and that it was “certainly . . . not clearly established law at the time” 
the case was tried.95 Unlike the confidence the court exuded in De La Cruz 
in 2008, by 2011, the First Circuit was begging for greater guidance on this 
issue. 
The Second Circuit, however, had no trouble concluding that autopsy 
 
87  Id. 
88  662 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2011). 
89  Id. at 112. Note that, unlike De La Cruz, Nardi was heard after the Davis opinion was 
handed down in 2006. 
90  Id. at 109. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  Nardi, 662 F.3d 107 at 109. 
95  Id. at 112. 
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reports are categorically not testimonial, in United States v. Feliz.96 The 
Feliz opinion clearly states that hearsay properly admitted under the 
business record or public record exception to the hearsay rule cannot be 
testimonial, even in light of Crawford.97 One basis for that conclusion lies 
with the Crawford concurrence, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist “praised 
what he considered to be Crawford’s per se exclusion of business records 
from the definition of testimonial.”98 Interestingly, the court found that 
autopsy reports can still be nontestimonial as long as they are properly 
entered through the business or public records hearsay exception, even 
when the report maker is aware that her report may be used at a future 
trial.99  Recall that statements made for the purpose of being used at future 
trial runs afoul of Davis.100 In addition, traditionally speaking, business and 
public records must be kept in the regular course of business (as opposed to 
being prepared with an eye toward trial) in order to meet those 
exceptions.101 
In contrast, the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have found autopsy reports 
testimonial pursuant to each precedent set forth in Crawford, Melendez–
Diaz, and Bullcoming.102 Although other circuits have encountered the 
issue, none have confronted it as deeply as the aforementioned.103 
 
96  467 F.3d 227, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2006). 
97  Id. (holding that hearsay admitted pursuant to the business records exception is not 
testimonial); Id. at 237 (holding that hearsay admitted pursuant to the public record 
exception is not testimonial). 
98  Feliz, 467 F.3d at 236; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 76 (2004) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring). Note that this is particularly puzzling because Davis made clear that 
statements made with an eye toward trial are by definition testimonial. Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006). 
99  Id.; see also Vega v. Walsh, 669 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a 
surrogate could testify to an autopsy report created by another, without admitting the autopsy 
report itself into evidence); United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 99 (2d Cir. 2013) cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014) (finding no error in admitting an autopsy report into evidence 
even though the report author did not testify at trial, and even though a surrogate testified in 
trial to its contents, because the autopsy was completed far in advance to the start of the 
criminal investigation of the defendant). 
100  Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
101  See, e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943). 
102  See, e.g., United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1231 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Applying 
the reasoning of Crawford, Melendez–Diaz, and Bullcoming, we conclude that the five 
autopsy reports admitted into evidence . . . violated the Confrontation Clause”); United 
States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) aff’d in part sub nom (finding autopsy 
reports testimonial because the Court determined the circumstances were sufficiently 
analogous Bullcoming, even though there were some differences). 
103  The Sixth Circuit held that autopsy reports may fall under the nontestimonial, 
business records exception. Mitchell v. Kelly, 520 F. App’x 329, 331 (6th Cir. 2013) (per 
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C.  WHAT THE STATES HEARD 
The following is not meant to be an exhaustive list, but merely a 
representative sampling of notable cases in which certain state courts have 
struggled with the testimonial nature of forensic documents at trial.104 
Massachusetts,105 Michigan,106 Missouri,107 New Mexico,108 
Oklahoma,109 North Carolina,110 New Jersey,111 and West Virginia112 have 
all held autopsy reports to be testimonial. Interestingly, the lower courts in 
Michigan first ruled that the autopsy report in People v. Lewis113 was 
nontestimonial because it was not prepared in anticipation of a trial.114 
However, when the decision was affirmed a year later by the Michigan 
 
curiam). The Ninth Circuit has also allowed portions of autopsy reports into evidence 
without finding a violation of either Crawford or Davis, even when the autopsy was attended 
by law enforcement. McNeiece v. Lattimore, 501 F. App’x 634, 636 (9th Cir. 2012). 
104  For a much more in-depth examination of the following cases, see Marc D. Ginsberg, 
The Confrontation Clause and Forensic Autopsy Reports—A “Testimonial” 74 LA. L. REV. 
117, 148–63 (2013–2014). 
105  Commonwealth v. Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1029 (Mass. 2009) (finding a surrogate’s 
testimony inadmissible where he based his expert opinion on the autopsy report, the report 
was not admitted into evidence, but a diagram from the report was); Commonwealth v. 
Reavis, 992 N.E.2d 304, 312 (Mass. 2013) (“Substitute medical examiner may not, however, 
testify to facts in the underlying autopsy report where that report has not been admitted.”). 
106  People v. Lewis, 788 N.W.2d 461, 466–67 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d in judgment, 
vacated in part by People v. Lewis, 806 N.W.2d 295, 295 (Mich. 2011) (holding initially 
that the autopsy report was nontestimonial, but vacating that portion of the opinion one year 
later). 
107  State v. Davidson, 242 S.W.3d 409, 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (holding the 
surrogate’s testimony inadmissible when the autopsy report was prepared at the request of 
law enforcement and admitted into evidence at trial). 
108  See, e.g., State v. Jaramillo, 272 P.3d 682, 686 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011) (finding the 
autopsy report testimonial when it was prepared in anticipation of litigation and conducted in 
a manner requiring judgment and analysis); State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 438 (N.M. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 64 (2013) (holding that “there is no meaningful distinction 
between factual observations and conclusions requiring skill and judgment,” as stated in 
Jaramillo). 
109  Cuesta-Rodriguez v. State, 241 P.3d 214, 229 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010) (finding an 
autopsy report testimonial when applying the Melendez–Diaz precedent). 
110  State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009) (finding an autopsy report 
testimonial when applying the Melendez–Diaz precedent). 
111  State v. Bass, No. 07-12-2903, 2013 WL 1798956, at *20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
Apr. 30, 2013) (per curiam) (State v. Bass, 224 N.J. 285, 316, 132 A.3d 1207, 1225 (2016)) 
(holding the autopsy report in question testimonial, using the “primary purpose” test). 
112  State v. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905, 917 (W. Va. 2012) (“[F]or purposes of use in 
criminal prosecutions, autopsy reports are under all circumstances testimonial.”). 
113  788 N.W.2d 461 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d in judgment, vacated in part by People 
v. Lewis, 806 N.W.2d 295 (Mich. 2011). 
114  Lewis, 788 N.W.2d at 466–67. 
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Supreme Court, it issued an order vacating that particular part of the 
opinion.115 Together, the Lewis cases are one example of the internal 
confusion caused by the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent, let alone the 
confusion present between states. 
In contrast to the states listed above, Arizona,116 California,117 
Florida,118 Illinois,119 Louisiana,120 Ohio,121 and South Carolina122 have held 
that autopsy reports are not testimonial. Most significant among these cases 
is State v. Medina,123 a case recently denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme 
 
115  Lewis, 806 N.W.2d at 295. 
116  State v. Medina, 306 P.3d 48, 62–64 (Ariz. 2013) (holding that an autopsy report did 
not violate the Confrontation Clause, considering Melendez–Diaz and Williams). 
117  People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 450 (Cal. 2012) (holding that an autopsy report was 
nontestimonial for the purpose of the Confrontation Clause in part because of this particular 
report’s lack of formality). 
118  Banmah v. State, 87 So. 3d 101, 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that 
“autopsy reports are non-testimonial because they are prepared pursuant to a statutory duty, 
and not solely for use in prosecution.”). 
119  People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570, 590 (Ill. 2012) (holding that “the autopsy report in 
the present case was not testimonial because it was (1) not prepared for the primary purpose 
of accusing a targeted individual or (2) for the primary purpose of providing evidence in a 
criminal case”); People v. Brewer, 987 N.E.2d 938, 951 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (holding the 
autopsy report in question nontestimonial because its primary purpose was to determine 
cause of death but not who was responsible for causing the death, nothing in the document 
linked the defendant to the crime, and, because the autopsy report was properly admitted into 
evidence, “the expert witness’s testimony cannot have violated the confrontation clause even 
if it had the effect of offering the report for the truth of the matters asserted therein.”); People 
v. Cortez, 931 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (holding that the autopsy report in 
question was nontestimonial because it was admitted through the business records hearsay 
exception and, pursuant to Crawford, documents admitted under that exception are 
nontestimonial). 
120  State v. Russell, 966 So. 2d 154, 166 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that a coroner’s 
report was properly admitted, even when the testifying witness had not personally prepared 
the report, because “[a] medical expert’s opinion is almost always based on some degree of 
hearsay, given the fact that numerous other medical personnel and records may be involved 
in the treatment of a patient” and therefore “[t]he issue is not one concerning admissibility, 
but rather the weight a fact finder gives to this expert testimony, dependent upon the 
professional’s qualifications and experience, and the facts upon which his opinion is 
based.”). 
121  State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621, 638 (Ohio 2006) (holding that the admission of the 
autopsy report did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the document had been 
admitted under the public records hearsay exception, and it could have been admitted under 
the business records exception). 
122  State v. Cutro, 618 S.E.2d 890, 896 (S.C. 2005) (holding that an autopsy report 
admitted under the business records hearsay exception does not violate the Confrontation 
Clause). 
123  State v. Medina, 306 P.3d 48 (Ariz. 2013) (case on direct appeal from a resentencing 
trial). 
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Court, where the issue on appeal was whether autopsy reports are 
testimonial for the purpose of the Confrontation Clause.124 
Maryland and New York have what has been called a “hybrid” policy 
on this issue.125 Essentially, this means that those two states do not fall 
neatly into either category jurisprudentially, but have opted for a middle-
ground approach, in an effort to form a coherent policy.126 This middle-
ground approach is characterized by regarding portions of an autopsy report 
as testimonial while others are not; for example, redacting “testimonial” 
conclusions from an autopsy report while admitting “nontestimonial” 
factual accounts of the procedure.127 Despite the existence of hybrid policies 
at the state level, federal courts remain split between the two traditional 
camps. 
II.  PREDICTIONS & SOLUTIONS 
A.  THE SUPREME COURT MAY FIND AUTOPSY REPORTS TESTIMONIAL 
As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court has not provided clear 
guidance on how its recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence can and 
should apply to future cases. Furthermore, at least two of the justices have 
specifically identified autopsy reports as future problems for Crawford and 
its progeny.128 This Comment argues that the Supreme Court may find 
autopsy reports testimonial when it eventually hears a case on the issue. 
First, due to the immense confusion and ongoing turmoil in the lower courts 
surrounding the testimonial status of forensic hearsay, the Court should take 
up the issue at some point. Second, when it does, it is possible that the 
Court will rule that autopsy reports are testimonial. It will then become 
necessary to deal with the problem of categorically testimonial autopsy 
reports, which can be done with help from the medical community. 
 
124  Id. at 62–65 (holding that the victim’s autopsy report was not testimonial for the 
purposes of the Confrontation Clause), cert. denied, Medina v. Arizona, 134 S. Ct. 1309 
(2014). 
125  See, e.g., Rollins v. State, 161 Md. App. 34, 82 (2006); People v. Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d 
428, 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (citing People v. Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d 38, 41 (N.Y. 2008)). 
For a more in-depth discussion of the hybrid approach, see Ginsberg, supra note 104, at 
163–65. 
126  Id. 
127  See, e.g., Rollins, 161 Md. App. at 82; Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 432 (citing Freycinet, 
892 N.E.2d at 42). 
128  Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 337 (2009) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2251 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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1.  Why The Supreme Court Will Likely Hear the Issue 
First, as examined above, the sheer amount of confusion and split 
opinions between circuit and state courts suggests that it would be 
inappropriate for the Court to ignore the testimonial status of autopsies 
indefinitely. Even though the Court recently declined to hear Medina v. 
Arizona,129 which presented an opportunity to resolve this exact question, 
perpetually burying its head in the sand will only cause continued 
uncertainty and disparate outcomes among lower courts.130 It is important to 
note that these contradictions are avoidable—it is not as if they are 
disagreeing on an area of the law for which states could exercise their 
individual discretion. The issue is whether the admission of a certain type of 
document violates a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights if testified to 
by someone other than its declarant. Unlike many areas of the law, this is a 
question that can have a settled, definitive answer—one that should apply to 
every criminal defendant throughout the country. Furthermore, given the 
paramount importance of a defendant’s rights in the criminal justice system, 
this question deserves a straight answer. 
2.  Autopsy Reports May Be Found Testimonial 
If the U.S. Supreme Court hears the issue, it may determine autopsy 
reports are testimonial. This prediction is supported by looking at each 
justice’s concerns in prior seminal cases. With the exception of Chief 
Justice Roberts, every single justice currently on the Court has written an 
opinion expressing their view on the testimonial status of forensic hearsay. 
The following examination of these overarching case concerns and 
individual opinions sheds more light on the question of whether the Court 
will find that autopsy reports are “testimonial.” 
i.  Justices Ginsberg, Kagan, and Sotomayor 
It is highly likely that Justices Ginsberg, Kagan, and Sotomayor would 
find autopsies testimonial for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause. 
Justice Ginsberg agreed with the majority opinion in Melendez–Diaz, which 
held that the laboratory certificates in question were testimonial because 
they were essentially identical to affidavits, which are categorically 
testimonial.131 The certificates functioned to “provid[e] testimony against 
petitioner, proving one fact necessary for his conviction—that the substance 
 
129  134 S. Ct. 1309, 1309 (2014) cert. denied. 
130  See supra notes 85–127 and accompanying text. 
131  557 U.S. at 310. 
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he possessed was cocaine.”132 Autopsy reports function in much the same 
way, providing the conclusions of the declarant in a testimonial manner. For 
example, autopsies are typically performed to determine an individual’s 
cause of death.133 An autopsy concluding that an individual’s cause of death 
was homicide (as opposed to an accident) could “prov[e] one fact necessary 
for his conviction.”134 Justice Ginsberg authored the majority opinion in 
Bullcoming, which held that an analyst who performs a forensic test must 
be brought into court personally to testify.135 In that opinion, Justice 
Ginsberg explained that the Confrontation Clause does not permit the 
prosecution “to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a 
testimonial certification—made for the purpose of proving a particular 
fact—through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the 
certification or perform or observe the test reported in the certification.”136  
Finally, Justice Ginsberg joined the dissent in Williams, which argued the 
paramount importance of a defendant’s ability to cross-examine the 
individual making testimonial statements about him.137 The dissent argues 
that without this check on human error, unreliable forensic reports would be 
admitted into the record and presumed as true.138 This concern can arguably 
also apply to autopsy reports. 
Justice Kagan substantially joined Justice Ginsberg’s majority opinion 
in Bullcoming and authored the dissent in Williams. This indicated that 
Justice Kagan may share Justice Ginsberg’s concerns about what role 
forensic documents serve in a criminal conviction. She also voiced her own 
concerns about admitting a document of that nature into evidence without 
giving a defendant the opportunity to cross-examine its creator.139 Justice 
Kagan’s dissent in Williams concentrated on this need for cross-
examination.140 Because of the ubiquity of television shows like CSI and 
Law & Order, which make frequent on-screen use of crime scene 
technicians and autopsies, the average person likely has some idea of what 
an autopsy entails.141 However, these shows can have the adverse effect of 
 
132  Id. at 313. 
133  HANDBOOK OF AUTOPSY PRACTICE 113 (Brenda L. Waters ed. 2009). 
134  Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313. 
135  564 U.S. 647, 661 (2011). 
136  Id. at 652. 
137  132 S. Ct. 2221, 2264 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
138  Id. 
139  Id. at 2264–65. 
140  Id. 
141  See N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction About 
Forensic Science Affects the Public’s Expectations About Real Forensic Science, 47 
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biasing lay jurors in criminal cases toward automatically placing forensic 
evidence on a pedestal, believing scientific tests reliable by default without 
considering the potential for human error.142 What the average juror might 
not know is that more than one in five physicians working in the country’s 
busiest morgues is not board certified in forensic pathology, although 
experts say such certification is necessary to ensure that doctors who 
perform autopsies have at least basic skills.143 That is, of course, when a 
medical doctor actually performs the autopsy—currently, eleven states 
operate under a coroner system, which means that an elected or appointed 
official with no required medical training is often in charge of overseeing 
autopsies.144 In 2007, an eighteen-year-old became Indiana’s youngest 
deputy coroner.145 
For states that still use the coroner system, or a hybrid of the coroner 
and medical examiner systems,146 coroners can choose to refer autopsies to 
 
JURIMETRICS 357–64 (2007). See generally Hon. Donald E. Shelton et al., An Indirect-Effects 
Model of Mediated Adjudication: The CSI Myth, the Tech Effect, and Metropolitan Jurors’ 
Expectations for Scientific Evidence, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1 (2009). 
142  Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 141. See generally Shelton, et al., supra note 141. 
143  Post Mortem: The Story So Far, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 16, 2011, 12:24 PM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/post-mortem-the-story-so-far. 
144  The position of coroner differs slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction from how 
they are chosen to what their qualifications are. 
Coroners are constitutional officers, with 82 percent being elected and 18 percent appointed. 
Coroners as elected officials fulfill requirements for residency, minimum age, and any other 
qualifications required by statute. They may or may not be physicians, may or may not have 
medical training, and may or may not perform autopsies. . . . Some serve as administrators of 
death investigation systems, while others are responsible solely for decisions regarding the cause 
and manner of death. Typical qualifications for election as a coroner include being a registered 
voter, attaining a minimum age requirement ranging from 18 to 25 years, being free of felony 
convictions, and completing a training program, which can be of varying length. The selection 
pool is local and small (because work is inconvenient and pay is relatively low), and medical 
training is not always a requirement. Coroners are independent of law enforcement and other 
agencies, but as elected officials they must be responsive to the public, and this may lead to 
difficulty in making unpopular determinations of the cause and manner of death. 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
PATH FORWARD 247 (2009). 
145  Id.; see also Associated Press, Teen Becomes Indiana’s Youngest Coroner, NEWS 
OKAY (May 12, 2007 12:00 AM), http://newsok.com/article/3053301. 
146  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 144, at 248–49. 
In contrast [to coroners], medical examiners are almost always physicians, are appointed, and are 
often pathologists or forensic pathologists. . . . In statewide systems, cities and counties have 
local medical examiners that are physicians trained to receive the reports of death, decide 
jurisdiction, examine the body, and make a determination of the cause and manner of death. 
They certify locally many obvious natural and accidental deaths. In statewide and regionalized 
statewide systems, local medical examiners do not need to be forensic pathologists and do not 
perform autopsies, but they do refer, according to protocols, deaths from violence—particularly 
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forensic pathologists, but there is no oversight of this process.147 There is 
also no system to assure that the coroner’s certification of an individual’s 
legal cause and manner of death is consistent with that forensic 
pathologist’s conclusions.148 Furthermore, the facilities for conducting 
autopsies vary greatly in quality between jurisdictions.149 Compounding the 
problem, there is no national standard for certifying or educating autopsy 
performers.150 Aside from facility quality and administrative oversight of 
the process, experts agree that the individual competence of the death 
investigator—be it a coroner, medical examiner, forensic pathologist, etc.—
is the key factor to maintaining the integrity of expert testimony in criminal 
and civil cases.151 
Justice Kagan is likely aware of at least some of the procedural and 
competency issues surrounding forensic investigators, as evidenced by her 
reference to a crucial laboratory mistake that was only discovered upon 
cross-examination of the forensic specialist who performed the test.152 It is 
for these reasons, as well as the unreliability surrounding autopsy reports, 
that Justice Kagan will most likely find autopsy reports testimonial. 
Justice Sotomayor is also likely to find autopsy reports testimonial. In 
addition to joining Justice Kagan’s dissent in Williams, Justice Sotomayor 
authored a concurrence in Bullcoming that sheds light on her particular 
views.153 In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor affirms the majority’s 
decision to bar the admission of the forensic reports, but does so based on 
 
suicides, homicides, and deaths occurring under suspicious circumstances—to a central or 
regional autopsy facility for autopsy and further follow-up by a forensic pathologist. In hybrid or 
mixed state systems, coroners may refer cases for autopsy to forensic pathologists, but there is no 
supervision or quality assurance to ensure that the coroner’s certification of the cause of death 
and manner of death is concordant with the pathologist’s conclusions. 
Id. 
147  See id. at 249. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. at 250. 
Only one-third of offices have in-house facilities to perform the histology needed to make 
microscopic diagnoses on tissues sampled at autopsy. Only one-third have in-house toxicology 
capabilities to identify drugs present in the deceased that either contributed to or were the 
primary cause of death. One-third do not have radiology services in-house that would allow the 
identification of missiles, disease, bony injury or identification features in decedents. Some 
coroner systems do not have any physical facility at all. 
Id. 
150  Id. at 250–51. 
151  Id. at 250. 
152  Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2264 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
153  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 668 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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reasoning from Davis.154 She emphasizes that the primary purpose of the 
reports at issue was to create “an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony . . . which renders it testimonial.”155 Although the report in 
Bullcoming was made in the course of a police investigation for drunk 
driving, Justice Sotomayor categorizes the documents as testimonial.156 
This is significant in the context of autopsy reports because they are 
certainly not made with the “primary purpose” of aiding an ongoing 
emergency; they are far more like statements made for an “evidentiary 
purpose” like the reports that troubled Justice Sotomayor.157 
ii.  Justice Thomas 
Justice Thomas has remained consistent throughout his Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence, routinely coming back to his position that the key to 
testimonial status is sufficient solemnity.158 As far back as Melendez–Diaz, 
Justice Thomas has insisted that the Confrontation Clause is only 
implicated in “formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits.”159 For 
Justice Thomas, such materials have included the laboratory certificates in 
Melendez–Diaz160 and the blood alcohol tests in Bullcoming,161 but not the 
DNA profile in Williams.162 To Justice Thomas, the DNA profile in 
Williams did not violate the Confrontation Clause because “it is neither a 
sworn nor a certified declaration of fact. Nowhere does the report attest that 
its statements accurately reflect the DNA testing processes used or the 
results obtained.”163 Justice Thomas noted that the reports in Melendez–
Diaz were notarized and that the reports in Bullcoming included a 
“Certificate of Analyst,” while the report in Williams had neither, nor 
anything comparable.164 
Although it may be possible to predict Justice Thomas’s likely analysis 
 
154  Id. (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) which established the 
“primary purpose” test for evaluating such statements). 
155  Id. at 671–72 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
156  Id. at 672. 
157  Id. 
158  See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2255–60 (2012) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
159  Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)). 
160  Id. 
161  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 665 (2011). 
162  Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2255–60 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
163  Id. at 2260. 
164  Id. 
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of whether autopsy reports are testimonial, it is difficult to predict his 
ultimate decision. This is because his final decision is likely to depend on 
the autopsy report in the given case. As previously addressed, the quality 
and “formality” of autopsy reports vary widely by jurisdiction.165 If a case 
dealt with a sufficiently formalized autopsy report, Justice Thomas would 
be likely to find it testimonial. However, if the autopsy report was not 
certified or attested in a formal manner, Justice Thomas would probably 
come to the opposite conclusion. In this respect, Justice Thomas is 
somewhat of a wild card. However, assuming that recommended 
procedures are followed, autopsy reports are more likely than not 
sufficiently formalized for Justice Thomas.166 
iii.  Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito 
Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito tend to vote together regarding 
testimonial questions. All three justices were part of the majority in Davis167 
as well as the dissents in Melendez–Diaz168 and Bullcoming.169 They only 
diverged in one instance: when Justices Kennedy and Alito joined the 
plurality in Williams while Justice Breyer chose to author his own 
concurrence. 
Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Melendez–Diaz was primarily concerned 
with the unclear precedent set by the majority, as well as the future concern 
for how the rule excluding a forensic document as testimonial might apply 
to other kinds of forensic hearsay, such as autopsy reports.170 Justice Breyer 
revived Justice Kennedy’s concern in the Williams concurrence, when he 
cited to Justice Kennedy’s Melendez–Diaz dissent: “Is the Confrontation 
Clause effectively to function as a statute of limitations for murder?”171 
 
165  See supra notes 143–151 and accompanying text. 
166  See HANDBOOK OF AUTOPSY PRACTICE, supra note 133, at 6 (encouraging colleagues 
to look over the report before final signatures are made in an attempt to catch any errors 
before the document is completed). Justice Thomas has stated that a document’s testimonial 
nature turns on whether that document is sufficiently “formalized”; that is to say, the 
document has been signed under penalty of perjury, notarized, or was written with sufficient 
“solemnity” showing that the author or signatory was careful and serious with the 
document’s preparation. See, e.g., Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2255–60 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
Therefore, for Justice Thomas, the more formal a document is, the more likely is it to be 
testimonial. 
167  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 815 (2006). 
168  Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330 (2009) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
169  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 674 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
170  557 U.S. at 335 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
171  Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2251 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
4. AMATO 4/21/2017  3:02 PM 
316 AMATO [Vol. 107 
Both justices substantially agree on the testimonial status of forensic 
hearsay, and even share the same fear regarding the potential result of this 
precedent’s application to autopsy reports. Although Justice Alito has not 
authored an opinion raising this question himself, he joined Justice 
Kennedy’s dissent where the inquiry into whether deeming autopsy reports 
testimonial could function as a statute of limitations on murder originated. 
However, as significant as that reservation may be, cases die all the time 
with their key witnesses.172 It is not uncommon for the death or 
unavailability of an important witness to handicap the prosecution, even in 
the case of serious crimes like murder.173 Although this policy concern has 
been brought up by multiple judges at different stages of Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence, it is unlikely that will be the deciding factor that 
makes autopsy reports nontestimonial, especially in light of the policy 
concerns expressed by Justices Ginsberg, Kagan, and Sotomayor.174 
The plurality in Williams, authored by Justice Alito and joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, is significant in a few respects. 
First, Williams emphasized that the testimonial question only applies to 
statements being admitted for their truth.175 The Federal Rules of Evidence 
permit expert witnesses to testify to the facts underlying their conclusions, 
even if those underlying facts are inadmissible (such as hearsay), for a 
narrow purpose: giving the jury context for the overall testimony, so that 
they can assign appropriate weight to the expert’s opinion.176  In other 
 
172  See, e.g., Veronica Rocha, U.S. Prosecutors Drop Case in Massive Yosemite Fire 
After Witnesses Die, L.A. TIMES (May 1, 2015, 11:46 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/la
now/la-me-ln-dismiss-indictment-rim-fire-20150501-story.html; Unavailable Witness Leads 
to Dropping Charges Against Brothers, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 13, 2015, 3:17 PM), http://
www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/news/ct-ptb-case-dismissed-st-0316-201503
13-story.html; Prosecutor: “I Don’t Have a Choice,” WANE.COM (May 4, 2015, 10:49 AM), 
http://wane.com/2015/05/04/charges-to-be-dropped-for-man-accused-of-murder/. 
173  Id. 
174  For example, the concern that all evidence against a defendant should be tested by 
the crucible of cross-examination. See, e.g., Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2264 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (emphasizing the importance of a defendant’s ability to cross-examine statements 
made against him); Id. at 2264 (emphasizing the importance of cross-examination in 
uncovering potential procedural errors in forensic tests). 
175  Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228 (plurality opinion). 
176  FED. R. EVID. 703. 
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware 
of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds 
of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion 
to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the 
opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate 
the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. 
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words, in certain situations the jury needs to hear the basis for the expert’s 
opinion, even if that basis consists of inadmissible hearsay, in order to 
judge the fairness or reliability of the conclusion the expert has drawn. 
However, the jury is not permitted to accept those underlying facts as true 
based solely upon the expert’s testimony—the purpose of hearing those 
facts is limited to assigning weight alone.177 In Williams, Justice Alito 
emphasized that there is no testimonial concern with experts testifying as 
such because those inadmissible facts are only getting to the jury for that 
limited purpose.178 Although the argument could be made that a surrogate 
who testifies about the outcome of an autopsy is necessarily testifying to the 
accuracy of what was conducted and what resulted (without having personal 
knowledge of either), the Williams opinion seems to suggest that so long as 
the proponent of the evidence is using the allowances carved out for expert 
opinions, the testimony of the surrogate may be admitted. However, it 
should be noted that autopsies are unlike the forensic hearsay that was the 
subject of Williams in that autopsies contain an opinion component whereas 
the hearsay in Williams was a DNA report with no opinion component.179 It 
is possible that this distinction, which formed the basis of the Williams 
plurality, may further lead Justices Alito, Breyer, and Kennedy to find 
autopsy reports testimonial—after all, if one subscribes to this view, that the 
underlying data from the autopsy report can be admitted for this limited 
purpose and a surrogate can be crossed-examined on the conclusions she 
draws from those facts, what is the actual danger in declaring autopsy 
reports testimonial? Furthermore, even if these justices were to find autopsy 
reports nontestimonial, the three together would not be enough to form a 
majority.180 
iv.  Chief Justice Roberts 
Unlike the other justices, Chief Justice Roberts has not authored his 
own opinion on this issue. However, it is worth noting that as chief justice, 
if he is in the majority or plurality, Chief Justice Roberts assigns who is to 
author the majority or plurality opinion.181 Without an authored opinion, the 
only clue as to where Chief Justice Roberts might come down on the issue 
 
Id. 
177  Id. 
178  Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228 (plurality opinion). 
179  Id. at 2244. The “opinion” of the expert in that case was whether the facts contained 
in the DNA report matched the facts contained in another report. Id. 
180  See infra Part IV. 
181  Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion Assignment, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1729–30 (2006). 
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is his selection of Justice Alito to author the plurality opinion in Williams. 
This might provide insight as to what reasoning and outcome Chief Justice 
Roberts finds persuasive, namely Justice Alito’s particular point of view. 
However, Chief Justice Roberts has not said or done anything to confirm 
that interpretation; he may just have preferred Justice Alito’s reasoning and 
outcome on the particular facts of Williams. Alternatively, he may have 
selected Justice Alito as the author to preserve a fragile coalition of justices 
who would author a less problematic opinion or outcome. Unfortunately, 
without an opinion directly authored by Chief Justice Roberts, there is 
nothing concrete on which to base a predication of his likely opinion on the 
issue.  
v.  The Empty Chair, Now Filled 
Of course, the elephant in the room is the recent Supreme Court 
vacancy. This opening injected greater uncertainty into this issue because of 
Justice Scalia’s active participation in the Court’s foundational opinions—
he authored the majority in Crawford, Davis, and Melendez–Diaz. 
Furthermore, as the most senior justice in the majority for Bullcoming, he 
was responsible for choosing Justice Ginsberg to author the majority 
opinion.182 Without Justice Scalia’s voice in this debate, for better or worse, 
the Court is missing much of its previous guidance on the issue. 
The confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch does not provide much 
insight into this issue. In his tenure as a circuit court judge, Justice Gorsuch 
only issued four, unreported opinions dealing with the Confrontation 
Clause,183 only one of which concerned the testimonial nature of certain 
hearsay statements, and even then, it was a tangential issue in the case.184 
Thus, making any prediction about his approach to the issue as a justice is, 
for the moment, difficult. 
There is reason to believe that the Court may find autopsy reports 
 
182  See supra note 181. Note that, when the chief justice is not part of the majority or 
plurality, the most senior justice in the majority or plurality is responsible for assigning the 
author of the main opinion. Id. at 1731. 
183  United States v. Leyva, 442 F. App’x 376 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Pursley, 
550 F. App’x 575 (10th Cir. 2013); Winbush v. Faulk, 510 F. App’x 746 (10th Cir. 2013); 
Sanders v. Miller, 555 F. App’x 750 (10th Cir. 2014). 
184  Leyva, 442 F. App’x at 382 n. 2 (“To mount a successful Confrontation Clause 
challenge, [the defendant] would have to show (among other things) both that any out of 
court statements relied upon by Officer Coleman were testimonial, and that he merely 
‘parrot[ed]’ that testimonial hearsay instead of using such statements to inform his own 
independent opinion. On this record, neither of those conclusions would be at all plain. In 
any event, and for the reasons we’ve already given, we believe that any such error would be 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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testimonial, as evident by examining of each justice’s rationales in past 
analogous cases. Although it is not possible to predict for every variable 
that might arise, based on the known concerns of each justice, it is a likely 
outcome. This presents a problem, though, for those prosecutors that rely on 
autopsy reports to make their case. What would happen to criminal trials if 
autopsy reports were barred from evidence unless the report preparer was 
able to testify to its contents? 
B.  AN INTERDISCIPLINARY SOLUTION 
Finding autopsy reports testimonial would pose a huge problem for 
prosecutors—namely barring the admission of an autopsy report where its 
creator is unavailable for trial. Although several possible solutions exist, an 
interdisciplinary solution might be most effective. Considering the 
problems posed by these documents in the legal community, the medical 
community should embrace the testimonial status of these documents and 
use common sense understanding to everyone’s advantage. 
One of the determining factors to whether something is testimonial lies 
in the statement’s “primary purpose,” namely whether it was made for the 
purpose of producing evidence against a defendant in a criminal trial, or 
whether it had some non-litigation purpose.185 Autopsy conductors, if not 
all forensic medical examiners,186 understand that their reports may be used 
in a future criminal trial187; at the very least, a forensic pathologist who 
performs an autopsy and determines the cause of death to be homicide 
should well know that her conclusion may become evidence against the 
perpetrator. It is also common for death investigators to perform autopsies 
at the request of law enforcement, or to have their own suspicions at the 
mere sight of a body (e.g., one riddled with bullet holes).188 Instead of 
closing their eyes to the possibility that one’s work could be used at trial (as 
one would have to do in order to argue that the report is nontestimonial), 
 
185  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
186  For a discussion of the key differences between clinical autopsies and forensic 
autopsies, see Andrew Higely, Tales of the Dead: Why Autopsy Reports Should Be Classified 
as Testimonial Statements Under the Confrontation Clause, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 171, 175 
(2013–2014). 
187  HANDBOOK OF AUTOPSY PRACTICE, supra note 133, at 125. 
In the broadest sense, a medicolegal autopsy is any autopsy that generates an evidentiary 
document that forms a basis for opinions rendered in a criminal trial, deposition, wrongful death 
civil suit, medical malpractice civil suit, administrative hearing, or workmen’s compensation 
hearing. Because any autopsy report can become such a document, all autopsies should be 
considered medicolegal. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
188  HANDBOOK OF AUTOPSY PRACTICE, supra note 133, at 137. 
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death investigators should prepare for that outcome to occur. 
As discussed above, there is an awareness within the medical 
community and within the government that there needs to be greater 
regulation of death investigators.189 This movement began around 2009.190 
In conjunction with this movement, the legal community and the medical 
community should collaborate on a re-drafting of the now-outdated Model 
Post-Mortem Examinations Act of 1954 (Model Act).191 The National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws issued the Model 
Act in 1954 as a model law.192  Like the Model Penal Code, states could 
choose to adopt or incorporate the Model Act’s provisions as law, which a 
number of states did.193  The Model Act’s stated purpose “is to provide a 
means whereby greater competence can be assured in determining causes of 
death where criminal liability may be involved.”194 The Model Act includes 
a provision for “honorary commissions of disinterested persons” that would 
govern an oversight body called the Post-Mortem Examination Office to 
ensure that forensic death investigators were equipped with the appropriate 
facilities and possessed the appropriate training to carry out their tasks.195 
However, this Model Act is outdated—it was written in 1954 and has never 
been updated to reflect scientific advances since that time.196 In fact, the 
Science, Technology, and Law Policy and Global Affairs Committee jointly 
with the Committee on Applied and Theoretical Statistics appealed to 
Congress in 2009 to redraft the Model Act on those grounds.197 
Furthermore, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, part of 
the United States Department of Commerce, has more recently appealed for 
 
189  See supra notes 144–151 and accompanying text. 
190  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 144, at 247. 
191  Robert A. Leflar, Drafting the Model Post-Mortem Examinations Act, 41 A.B.A. J. 
266, 266–68 (1955). See generally MODEL POST-MORTEM EXAMINATIONS ACT (PREFATORY 
NOTE) (1954). 
192  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 144, at 242. 
193  Id. at 243; Leflar, supra note 191; see, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 14-15-301-309 (West); 
La. Civ. Code Ann. r.P. T. III, Refs & Annos; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 38, § 2 (West). 
194  Leflar, supra note 191, at 266. 
195  MODEL POST-MORTEM EXAMINATIONS ACT, supra note 191. 
196  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 144, at 266; NAT’L INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS 
AND TECH., RECOMMENDATION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: MODEL LEGISLATION FOR 
MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEMS 1 (2016) (“The 1954 act is so obsolete that it 
provides little guidance for either modern medical examiner or coroner legislation and needs 
to be updated.”). 
197   NAT’L INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECH., RECOMMENDATION TO THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL: MODEL LEGISLATION FOR MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEMS, supra 
note 196. 
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funding to redraft the model legislation.198 Such a redrafting should include 
a provision suggesting or requiring that autopsies be undertaken with the 
intent to perfectly preserve the process (with video, photographs, etc.) such 
that another professional may review and obtain facts and data to support an 
original, independent conclusion. 
Performing the autopsy with the expectation of peer review serves 
multiple purposes. First, it can act as a deterrent against producing a sloppy 
work product. Second, it helps to ensure that all stages of the autopsy are 
preserved so that a future surrogate may be able to come to his own 
independent conclusion about information on which he can be cross-
examined. Relying on images and video is far preferable to a cold paper 
record. Not only will the surrogate have the opportunity to view the 
underlying “facts” (e.g., condition of the body), but she will be able to 
observe the manner in which the examination was performed, taking her 
own understanding of the standards in the field into consideration when 
opining on the quality of the autopsy, if necessary.199 
This will not be an overly burdensome requirement. Most death 
investigators already take pictures in accordance with autopsies, although 
their purpose in doing so is not often principally to preserve the look of the 
body for future review.200 Today, even the most basic cameras have high 
image resolution, making it easier than ever to take high-quality pictures at 
a low cost. Other imaging techniques have becoming increasingly common 
in autopsies in recent years as well, including MRIs, CTs, and 
ultrasonography.201 
Undoubtedly, there is the question of the quality of the video or 
photographs produced, just as there would be with videos or photographs 
admitted into evidence (if they must actually be admitted) for any other 
purpose in a criminal trial: Are they authentic? Do they fairly and 
accurately depict what they purport to? However, these concerns can be 
adequately addressed in the redrafting of a new model standard for post-
 
198  NAT’L INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 196, at 1–4. 
199  There are other benefits to adopting this solution, such as giving juries the ability to 
see more than just conclusory statements edited through the mouth of an individual who 
cannot and will not be subject to cross-examination. This method was essentially accepted 
by the First Circuit in Nardi v. Pepe, 662 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2011). 
200  Medical professionals are already accustomed to the standard of taking pictures at an 
autopsy in anticipation that they will be viewed by others, such as for teaching purposes. 
HANDBOOK OF AUTOPSY PRACTICE, supra note 133, at 6–7; see also NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, supra note 144, at 264. 
201  HANDBOOK OF AUTOPSY PRACTICE, supra note 133, at 102–03; see also Ian S.D. 
Roberts. et. al., Post-Mortem Imaging as an Alternative to Autopsy in the Diagnosis of Adult 
Deaths: A Validation Study, 379 THE LANCET 136, 136 (2012). 
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mortem examinations, as well as in the case law of the jurisdiction that 
likely already exists. Furthermore, as seen in Williams, the Supreme Court 
is open to the possibility of surrogate testimony as long as only the opinions 
of the expert, not the underlying facts, are being admitted for their truth.202 
Although it is true that video footage and pictures of the autopsy may 
improve the ability of independent reviewers who did not perform the initial 
autopsy to review the actions taken and draw similar or different 
conclusions independent of the initial examiner, the later independent 
reviews inherently cannot physically “redo” the autopsy. In other words, if 
the first examiner conducts a procedure or test incorrectly or fails to test for 
something, the results of the entire autopsy may be called into question. 
Furthermore, it is true that those errors may not appear on, or be obvious in, 
the video footage.  However, the perfect should not be the enemy of the 
good in this situation. Embracing the potential testimonial nature of autopsy 
reports by preparing them as if future independent review is inevitable goes 
a long way toward solving the current problem.203  
CONCLUSION 
The current state of the law regarding the testimonial status of forensic 
hearsay is extremely vague and problematic, particularly with reference to 
autopsy reports. Since 2004, the Supreme Court has produced fractured and 
complicated opinions that have left lower courts to develop their own 
varying doctrines with regard to the testimonial nature of autopsy reports. It 
is therefore important that the Supreme Court grant certiorari on the issue. 
Given the continuous state of confusion in this area, the Court should 
eventually resolve the issue with new precedent. In light of the Court’s 
previous jurisprudence, and the vocal stances of almost every justice 
individually, it is likely that the Court may find autopsy reports testimonial 
for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause. This, however, presents an 
enormous problem for older murder prosecutions. This Comment’s 
proposed solution to this problem is simple, but it takes cooperation from 
the medical community. Ultimately, the courts should embrace the 
testimonial nature of autopsy reports and capitalize on foreknowledge so 
that they may be used at trial. In order to capitalize on this, the goal should 
be the creation of autopsy reports with the possibility of a future trial in 
mind, such that surrogate testimony will be reliable, independent from the 
original conclusions, and clear enough that a jury can see with their own 
eyes what the surrogate is talking about. Instead of pretending autopsies are 
 
202  Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2235–36 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
203  See supra notes 200–201 and accompanying text. 
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independent, nontestimonial documents, as some scholars have tried to 
suggest,204 the justice system should be doing the opposite. Embracing their 




204  See generally, e.g., supra note 14. 
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